This paper uses Bayesian Model Averaging to examine the driving factors of equity returns of U.S. Bank Holding Companies. BMA has as an advantage over OLS that it accounts for the considerable uncertainty about the correct set (model) of bank risk factors. We nd that out of a broad set of 12 risk factors only the market, real estate, and high-minus-low Fama-French factors are reliably related to US bank stock returns over the period 1986-2010. Other factors are either only relevant over specic subperiods or for subsets of bank holding companies. We discuss the implications of our ndings for empirical banking research.
Introduction
The nature of their business exposes banks to various types of risk. Not only may these risks uctuate over time as economic conditions change, also the exposure of banks to these risks may vary over time. Regulators and supervisors rely on a smorgasbord of tools to track these (time-varying) risk exposures. One set of indicators relies on market prices, such as bank stock market returns.
These indicators can be obtained by relating bank stock returns to various risk factors, such as market, interest rate, and other relevant risks. The challenge for regulators and supervisors is to discover which risk factors are relevant for which types of nancial institutions at a specic point in time. However, based on a broad literature survey, it is fair to state that there is little consensus on the risk factors, apart from the market factor, that drive bank stock returns. This is clear from Table 1 which gives an overview of the dierent (combinations of ) risk factors that have been used in the literature so far. The 24 papers we refer to have related bank stock returns to various combinations of no less than 17 dierent risk factors. The uncertainty about which risk factors to include in a bank factor model is labeled "model uncertainty". In this paper, we implement a Bayesian framework that explicitly takes into account the uncertainty about the relevant set of factors ("model uncertainty"). We apply this methodology to US Bank Holding Companies over the period 1986 − 2010.
Our paper contributes to an expanding literature that measures banking risk as the exposure of bank (sector) stock returns to some set of predened risk factors. In contrast to other papers, we do not impose a specic returngenerating process. When estimating only one model, the researcher imposes the chosen model on the data and the only uncertainty that is considered is parameter uncertainty, where one typically interprets the coecients of signicant variables. The uncertainty about which risk factors to include (model uncertainty) is typically ignored. In this paper, we explicitly take model uncertainty into account by using Bayesian Model Averaging techniques to estimate bank factor models. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to apply Bayesian Model Averaging in the banking literature 1 . Suppose that the literature oers a list of k potential explanatory risk factors. In the set of linear factor models, 2 k dierent model combinations can be made, where each model consists of (a subset of ) the explanatory variables. Using Bayesian Model Averaging techniques, we are able to account for this considerable model uncertainty. BMA compares all models simultaneously, as opposed to conditioning on a single individual model. Each individual model is attributed a posterior probability and the posterior parameter estimate is obtained as the weighted average of the pa-Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) was rst developed by Leamer [44] , and has since been used in several disciplines, ranging from statistics (Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting [52] and Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, and Volinsky [36] ), over a large literature on cross-country growth regressions (Fernandez, Ley, and Steel [24] , Brock and Durlauf [8] and Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller [53] among others) to nance (Cremers [14] , Avramov [4] and Wright [66] ). 3 rameters over the dierent models, where the posterior model probabilities are used as weights. Because this approach considers all models simultaneously, we obtain useful insight into the importance of each regressor. For each risk factor, we can compute its posterior inclusion probability, i.e. how likely it is that a particular risk variable is part of the model, making it a useful tool to evaluate the relevance of the dierent risk factors.
In the rst part of the analysis, we compare the results of BMA versus OLS in explaining the impact of various risk factors on the returns of a banking index. More specically, we relate weekly excess returns of an equally-weighted portfolio of the 50 largest (in terms of total assets) US Bank Holding Companies to innovations in the dierent risk factors. In the exposition of the advantages of BMA, we use an index of the 50 largest BHCs. In subsequent parts, we use various alternative indices (such as large, systemically important BHCs). We cover most of the candidate risk factors that have been previously used in the literature, but also introduce some risk factors that have received attention only in recent times, such as the volatility implied by option prices or indicators of interbank stress risk. Details on the motivation for including these factors and on their construction can be found in Section 1.2. Full sample (1986 − 2010) results reveal that the market and real estate factor, as well as the high-minus-low book-to-market Fama-French factor, are the most important risk factors, with posterior inclusion probabilities close to a 100 percent. Other factors, maybe with the exception of the 3-month T-Bill rate, do not seem to be reliably related to the returns on the broad bank index. We show that our BMA approach that takes into account model uncertainty leads to dierent conclusions than one that does not (OLS). Moreover, our results indicate that there is no correct or dominant model. The most likely model has a posterior model probability of less than 25%, suggesting that accounting for model uncertainty is important.
In the second part of the analysis we investigate whether or not bank factor models vary over time or dier according to the type of bank holding companies. In a rst step, we estimate the BMA model with the same set of risk factors on a pre-and post 2007 sample. In a more general analysis, we conduct rolling-window BMA regressions, basically re-estimating the BMA model each quarter using two years of weekly data. We nd that factors such as the implied volatility index and term and default spread frequently switch between being economically and statistically relevant or not. Hence, specic periods (typically those characterized by increased nancial market stress) may be associated with dierent bank risk exposures, which may have implications for, e.g., the supervision of bank risk or cost of capital considerations. Dierences across studies with respect to the most relevant risk factors may hence not only be due to a failure to account for model uncertainty, but may also be the consequence of looking at dierent periods. In fact, some factors may be 'dormant' for a long time, and hence undetectable in short (tranquil) samples, to suddenly appear in times of market stress.
We also compare the results of our baseline portfolio of the 50 largest Bank Holding Companies with alternative portfolios of BHCs. In particular, within the sample of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs), we dierentiate between var-1.1 Portfolio construction 4 ious 'types' by constructing portfolios of BHCs according to size (largest 15 versus smallest 50), sound versus distressed BHCs and BHCs with a stable retail focus versus systemic stress-prone banks. Details on the construction of these portfolios are mentioned in Section 1.1. The general conclusion from this analysis is that while the relevant set of exposures does vary substantially over time, it is relatively stable across bank types.
Finally, we discuss some implications of our ndings for empirical banking research based on stock returns. In fact, return-generating models of bank stocks are not only a useful (supervisory) tool to uncover risk exposures, but also serve as an input in various setups in empirical banking research. For example, computing abnormal returns in event studies requires the specication of a benchmark model. Additionally, residual-based measures of uncertainty (idiosyncratic volatility) or transparency (R-squared) require an accurate identication of risk factors and a correct specication of the factor model. Accurate measures of banks' exposures to stock market movements (e.g. to compute capital charges for systematic risk) also hinge on the correct specication of a factor model. In Section 4, we discuss the implications of our ndings for these setups.
The paper is organized as follows. Since this paper is essentially empirical, we start with a detailed description of the data used in this paper. Subsection 1.1 explains how the overall bank index and the cross-sectional portfolios sorted on bank characteristics are constructed. Subsection 1.2 motivates our choice of the set of risk factors and discusses their construction. Section 2 presents the BMA framework we use to analyze the importance of the risk factors. Section 3 discusses the main empirical results. In subsection 3.1, we present results from models with time-invariant risk exposures. In subsection 3.3, we allow for time variation in the model specications as well as time variation in the signicance and magnitude of the factor exposures. We discuss the implications of our ndings for dierent strands of empirical banking research (event studies, market risk, idiosyncratic volatility) in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.Data
Portfolio construction
Our initial analysis is conducted on a portfolio of the 50 largest (based on total assets) US Bank Holding Companies (BHCs, henceforth) over the period 1986 − 2010. The set of BHCs is rebalanced quarterly to reect the actual, time-varying ranking. The portfolio return is an equally weighted average of the underlying weekly returns and measured in excess of the 3-Month Treasury Bill rate. In addition to this portfolio of large US BHCs, we also examine in Section 3.2 portfolios of BHCs with a specic business model.
We construct portfolios according to size (large versus small), sound versus distressed banks, and BHCs with a steady retail versus an expansionary, systemic risk-prone strategy. To dene the universe of publicly traded BHCs and relate the stock price information to accounting data, we use the link provided by the New York Fed 2 . We construct two portfolios based on a size criterium:
This link is only available until the end of 2007, but is manually extended until the end 1.1 Portfolio construction 5 the largest 15 BHCs and the smallest 50 BHCs, based on total assets (and quarterly rankings). In contrast to small BHCs, the largest 15 banks operate nationwide, are more interconnected through interbank payments or correlated exposures and may benet from implicit too-big-to-fail guarantees. Sound versus distressed banks are determined based on two characteristics: protability and leverage. A bank is considered to be sound (in a given quarter) if it belongs to the highest quartile in terms of both return on assets and the equity-tototal-assets ratio. Sound banks are hence protable and protect this source of franchise value by means of prudent capitalization. A bank is categorized as distressed in a given quarter if it is combining low prots and high leverage (lowest quartile of ROA and equity to assets). We purposely identify sound and distressed BHCs using two dimensions to distinguish them from (successful) gambling (poorly capitalized with high prots) or bad luck (low prots while strongly capitalized). Finally, we construct a portfolio of BHCs with a steady retail focus and one of expanding, tail risk-prone BHCs. De Jonghe [15] and Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz [20] show which bank characteristics make banks more subject to extreme systematic risk. Large and expanding banks with low leverage, a reliance on wholesale funding and focused on noninterest income generating activities experienced the largest stock price drops in the 1998 and 2007 − 08 crises (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz [20] ) and have higher tail betas (De Jonghe [15] ). To construct these two portfolios, we take the following steps. First, we compute, by quarter, the quartiles of each of the following ve dimensions: size, asset growth, leverage, wholesale funding and share of interest income; and allocate a score of 1 to 4 to the corresponding quartile. Subsequently, we sum the quartile-based scores and obtain an index between 5 and 20. Tail risk-prone banks are those with a score of at least 17, implying that they should score high in almost all dimensions, while retail banks are those with a score of eight or less.
Summary statistics of the returns on the various portfolios are reported in panel A of Table 2, while Table 3 provides more detailed information on the (variables used in the) construction of the portfolios. The average annualized return on the portfolio of the largest 50 BHCs is 14.1%. Systemic risk-prone BHCs earned a higher annualized return over the period 1986 − 2010. While most portfolios yield an annualized return of almost 10% or higher, the distressed BHC portfolio's return is almost zero. Larger BHCs, sound or tail-risk prone BHCs yield a higher annualized return vis-à-vis small, distressed or retailoriented BHCs. In general, the correlations between contrasting portfolios of BHCs (large versus small, sound versus distressed, and retail versus tail riskprone) are slightly lower than the average pairwise correlation indicating that we are indeed identifying types of BHCs with dierent strategies.
More evidence on the heterogeneity between the identied BHC types is of 2010. Similar to the procedure described by the NY Fed, we use information of the SNL nancial database containing all publicly traded bank holding companies in a quarterly le format. 6 reported in Table 4 . For each constructed portfolio of BHCs, we report the average value of a set of bank characteristics as well as the p-value of a dierence in means test for the opposite portfolios. The largest 15 versus smallest 50 BHCs portfolios are determined only based on total assets, which is reected in the large dierence in the logarithm of their total assets. However, large and small banks also dier substantially in their level of capitalization, reliance on deposit funding and loan granting, and consequently also in the source of income (mainly interest income for small banks). Sound, high franchise value banks are contrasted with distressed banks based on their level of capitalization and prots. Distressed banks hold 50% less Tier 1 capital compared to sound banks and are loss-making over the sample period. In addition, the BHCs in these two portfolios dier markedly in the amount of loan loss provisions as well as their cost eectiveness. Poor credit risk management and inecient cost management lead to undercapitalization and poor protability. Retail banks are dierentiated from diversied, wholesale-oriented banks in many dimensions. By construction, the retail banks are smaller, better capitalized, experience stable (near zero) growth, and focus more on retail deposits and interest income generating activities as compared to tail risk-prone nancial conglomerates. Nevertheless, they are equally protable and cost ecient and provision similarly for potential credit risk. 7 

Bank Risk Factors
Excess bank stock returns reect changes in the market value or net worth of a (portfolio of ) bank(s). Hence, stock returns reect the market's assessment of the banks' prot potential and risk prole. Saunders and Cornett (2014) identify the following sources of risk that aect banks' net worth: interest rate, credit, liquidity, foreign exchange, sovereign, market, o-balance sheet, and technology risks.We follow the labelling of Saunders and Cornett [54] and classify innovations in a total of twelve factors, which have been used in the previous literature, to one of ve broad risk categories. 3
Interest Rate risk
A nancial intermediary is, through its activity of maturity transformation, exposed to interest rate risk caused by dierences in the duration of its assets and liabilities. Table 1 shows that, since Flannery and James [26] , most studies include at least one interest rate factor. Usually, it is the short-term interest rate, but it is often combined with either the term spread or a long-term interest rate.
As a short-term interest rate risk factor, we include the three-month Treasury bill rate (TB3). As a second interest rate risk factor, we include the term spread (TS), calculated as the dierence between the yield on a 10-year government bond and the three-month Treasury bill rate 4 . In models with both the short rate and the term spread, the short rate captures the eect of a parallel shift in the term structure, while the term spread tests for the eect of a change in the slope of the term structure of interest rates. As the duration of bank liabilities is usually shorter than the duration of banks' assets, we expect rate increases to negatively aect bank stock returns. However, not nding a signicant exposure does not necessarily mean that banks are not exposed to interest rate risk, but that they may have succesfully hedged their exposure, e.g. by means of interestrate derivatives.
Credit Risk
We include two proxies for credit risk, one related to exposures to corporate credit risk and one related to real estate exposures. As a measure of economywide (corporate) default risk, we include the yield dierence between Moody's BAA and AAA-rated corporate bonds (DS), i.e. the yield dierence between bonds with the lowest and highest investment-grade rating. Because a rise in ! Saunders and Cornett [54] identify 8 risk factors, of which we include ve. We do not include a proxy for country risk as all nancial institutions in the sample are incorporated in the US. Furthermore, technology and operational risk are mostly idiosyncratic and discrete events, and are therefore also not included as a systematic risk factor. O-balance sheet risk is not incorporated directly, but is indirectly captured by the ve other risk categories. For example, market sentiment, proxied by the VXO implied volatility index, should provide an indication of the likelihood with which contingencies arise that mover o-balance sheet assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. " We do not include the long-term interest rate to avoid perfect multicollinearity as we already include the short rate and term spread, dened as the dierence between the long and the short rate. 
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Liquidity risk
Banks provide liquidity to the economy (by nancing illiquid assets with liquid claims) but this may pose a risk when liability holders demand immediate cash for the claims they hold with the banks. We include three liquidity risk factors, corresponding with the three main groups of liability holders: banks, retail depositors and wholesale nanciers. Banks strongly rely on each other for their day-to-day liquidity management. Uncertainty about other banks' solvency creates tensions on the interbank market. As an indicator of credit risk in the nancial system, potentially leading to interbank market freezes, we include the Treasury-EuroDollar spread (TED spread), dened as the dierence between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month Treasury bill rate (IMF [38] and Garleanu and Pedersen [28] ). We expect bank stocks to react negatively to shocks in the TED spread 6 , because a widening of the spread is an indication of increased distress risk, and hence a loss of trust, in the nancial sector.
As a measure of liquidity tightness in the market of deposits, we use the spread between the three month deposit rate (three month unregulated time deposit) and the three month Treasury Bill rate (DepS) (see e.g. Dewenter and
Hess [17] ). The sign is unpredictable. On the one hand, deposit inows that are seeking a safe haven during crisis periods provide banks with a natural hedge to fund drawn credit lines and other commitments (Gatev and Strahan [29] ).
On the other hand, the banking system in its role as a stabilizing liquidity insurer acts as an active seeker of deposits via managing bank deposit rates (Acharya and Mora [1] ). The third liquidity measure is the dierence between # SIC code 65 consists of the following subgroups: 6510 (real estate operators (no developers) & lessors), 6512 (operators of nonresidential buildings), 6513 (operators of apartment buildings), 6519 (lessors of real property), 6531 (real estate agents & managers (for others)), 6532 (real estate dealers (for their own account)), 6552 (land subdividers & developers (no cemeteries)). $ The three-month LIBOR-OIS (overnight index swap) spread would be an alternative to the TED spread (Giesecke and Kim [31] ) but is unfortunately not available over the entire period 1986-2010. 9 the Federal Funds Overnight rate and the three month LIBOR rate (MMS, i.e. money market spread), which measures tightness in the wholesale funding market, in particular the money market (see e.g. Taylor and Williams [63] ).
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Since MMS is related to funding conditions in the more volatile money market, we expect it to be a more important risk factor in times of nancial market stress.
Foreign Exchange risk
Large banks may have exchange rate exposure, e.g. through foreign lending or derivative exposures. As a measure of currency risk (FX), we use the Nominal Major Currencies Index, available from the Federal Reserve Board's H 15 lings.
An increase in the index is associated with an appreciation of the USD with respect to a trade-weighed basked of (main) currencies. Such appreciation of the USD will aect banks either negatively or positively, depending on whether they are long or short the foreign currency (see e.g. Chamberlain, Howe, and
Popper [9] ).
Market risk
As a proxy for market risk, we include returns on a broad equity market portfolio (Market), which is the only factor that is common to all studies explaining (bank) stock returns. This exposure, or 'market beta', measures how sensitive returns are to aggregate market movements, and hence to changes in general economic and nancial market conditions. As a proxy for the market portfolio, we use the Non-Financial Market Index from Datastream (code TOTLIUS). We use a market index excluding the nancial sector to avoid spurious results. We additionally include the VXO implied volatility index 7 to capture market sentiment. The VXO is a forward-looking risk measure that has predictive power for returns at relative short horizons (up to 3 months), and hence diers from other state variables that have predictive power (if any) beyond that horizon (see e.g.
Londono [48] ). We expect bank stock returns to have a negative exposure to VXO innovations.
Since the seminal work of Fama and French [22] , a large literature has emerged showing that stock returns are not only related to market returns, but also to returns on a size and a value factor 8 . We use the size (SMB) and value (HML) factors made available by Kenneth French on his website. Both the size and value factor earn a positive risk premium, implying that risk increases % This is a weighted index of American implied volatilities calculated from eight near-themoney, near-to-expiry, S&P 100 call and put options with a 1 month maturity. We use the VXO rather than the better known S&P500-based VIX index because the former is already available from 1986 on (compared to 1990 for the VIX index). Notice that the VIX and VXO index overlap perfectly until 22 September 2003, as until that date also the VIX was based on S&P100 option prices. In the post 2003 period, both indices remain highly correlated. & The size factor is calculated as the dierence in return between small and large stocks (SMB); the value factor is the dierence in return between stocks characterized by high and low (HML) book-to-market value.
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10 with exposures to both factors. Liew and Vassalou [46] argue that persistently high Book-to-Market stocks face a higher risk of distress and that they are more likely to survive when the economic outlook is good rather than bad. Similarly, small capitalization stocks are more likely to do well during periods of economic growth, and more likely to be the rst to disappear during periods of economic slowdown. The vulnerability of high Book-to-Market and small capitalization stocks to changes in the economic cycle leads to a positive link between the performance of the HML and SMB strategies and future economic growth. In sum, both the size and value factor seem to contain information about the future state of the economy not captured by the market factor alone, and are hence also candidate risk factors for bank stock returns.
Summary
To summarize, we relate excess returns to a total of twelve risk factors, which are classied in ve groups. According to the ecient market hypothesis, we only expect a relationship between bank stock returns and unanticipated changes in risk factors. To ensure that we capture unexpected movements in the risk factors, we take the residuals from an AR(n) model for each risk variable, where n is determined by the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion. Panel Table 2 reports summary statistics for the dierent factor shocks (and reports both the name and abbreviation used throughout the paper), as well as the expected signs of the factor exposures.
B of
Bayesian Model Averaging
This section outlines Bayesian Model Averaging in the normal linear regression model. We focus on the big picture and relegate a more detailed but technical discussion to an online appendix. As in Magnus, Powell, and Prufer [50] , we start from:
where y and ε are (T × 1) vectors of bank index returns and random disturbances, respectively. x 1 denotes the (T ×k 1 ) matrix of regressors that are always included, i.e. for which no model uncertainty exists. In our application, x 1 is simply a constant term, so that k 1 = 1. x 2 is an (T × k 2 ) matrix of at most k 2 (contemporaneous) explanatory variables for bank stock returns. β 1 and β 2 are the unknown parameter vectors. We assume that the disturbances (ε 1 , . 
2 ), and β (k) 2 the corresponding parameter vector.
We use standard non-informative priors for the parameters that are common to all models, namely σ 2 and β 1 . The prior for β 2 , Equation (3) is informative and centered around zero:
We specify the prior variance V (k) 0
using Zellner's (1986) g-prior. Following Fernandez, Ley, and Steel [23] among others, we set g = inv(max(n, k 2 2 )) and
The attractive feature of this prior is that it becomes weaker the more informative the data is, either because the sample size T or the number of explanatory variables k 2 is large. With respect to model prior probabilities, we simply follow standard practice and assume that each model M (k) is equally likely 9 :
' We do check the robustness of our results to alternative priors, such as the collinearity adjusted dilution prior of George [30] .
Under the normal linear regression framework, the likelihood function, assuming model M (k) is the most likely model, is given by
By combining the likelihood function and the priors, given the data y and model M k , one obtains the joint posterior density on a specic model. However, our goal is to combine information from multiple models. Given the data y and a prior model probability for model M (k) (Equation (5)), the posterior model probability 10 -the probability that model M (k) is the most likely model, after seeing the data and updating the prior belief -can be expressed as
where p(y|M k ) is the marginal likelihood, and
The posterior parameter estimates are calculated as the weighted average of the parameter estimates over the dierent models, using the posterior model probabilities λ (k) as weights:
2i |y, M (k) ) is the estimate for the slope parameter β 2i given model M (k) . Following Leamer [45] , the posterior variance is dened as
The posterior variance of β 2i consists of two terms: the rst is the weighted sum of the variances across all models, whereas the second terms depends on the dierence between the posterior mean (equation 8) and the model specic
2i |y, M (k) ). Hence, if the parameter estimate is very dispersed across models, this implies larger model uncertainty which is translated into larger parameter uncertainty.
In a traditional setup, researchers may use the Akaike's information criterion (Akaike [3] ), the Schwarz's criterion (a Bayesian information criterion, Schwarz [57] ) or the Fisher's information criteria (Wei [65] ), among others (Bossaerts and Hillion [7] ) to select a single, most likely model. Because researchers may 'search' for the best specication among a set of alternatives, data snooping and overtting are genuine concerns, in particular when there are many plausible risk factors that are potentially correlated. Our approach, on the other hand, does not seach for a unique model, but averages over all possible linear models giving a higher weight to more likely models. 13 The key ambition of this paper is to determine what regressors are reliably related to bank stock returns. For this reason, one of the most important metrics for our purpose is the "Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP)", which measures the likelihood that a certain regressor should be included in the "true" model.
Following Leamer [45] , the PIP is calculated as the sum of the posterior model probabilities of the models that include variable x 2i with i = 1, ..., k 2 :
where I is an indicator equal to one if the variable x 2i is present in model M (k) and zero otherwise. Table 5 reports estimation results for our baseline specication, which relates returns on the index of the 50 largest BHCs to the 12 bank risk factors discussed in Section 1.2. In the top panel, we report for each risk factor (12 columns) the OLS factor exposure and t-statistic, the BMA factor exposure and t-statistic as well as the Posterior Inclusion Probability of that factor. The most striking nding is that only three factors, namely the market, HML, and real estate factor, have a Posterior Inclusion Probability (PIP) 11 close to a 100 percent, strongly suggesting that these three factors should always be included in a model for bank stock returns. All other factors, including the interest rate factors, have PIPs and factor exposures close to zero. The PIP of the short rate is slightly higher (47%), but still below 50%. This nding is surprising, and challenges the predictions of many (theoretical) models of banking risk that give a prominent role to interest rate risk (see e.g. Flannery and James [26] ).
The fact that the market factor is important is not suprising, and neither is its magnitude (close to 1). The HML and real estate factor are absent in all but 2 and 1 of the papers listed in Table 1 , respectively. Our results suggest that they are more reliably related to bank stock returns than more frequently used regressors. The HML exposure has a positive sign, as expected given its positive (negative) association with future economic growth (distress risk). Given that booming and subsequently rapidly decreasing housing prices were one of the key causes of the nancial crisis that started in 2007, our nding of a positive and signicant association of our real estate factor with bank stock returns is neither surprising.
BMA also provides information on how likely a given model is. In fact, an individual regressor will have a large PIP to the extent that it is part of the most likely models. Panel C of Table 5 reports the 10 specications with the highest model probability. For each model, we report the model's likelihood, what factors it contains, as well as its adjusted R-squared. A rst observation is that the 12 factor model is not among the top 10 models. The richest top 10 model contains at most 5 factors. Not surprisingly, the market, HML, and real estate factor are part of all these models (thus leading to a PIP of 100%). Second, a model consisting of only these three factors is the most likely.
In addition to the posterior mean and the posterior inclusion probability of the coecient, we also compute the sign certainty statistic, as used in Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller [53] and Doppelhofer and Weeks [18] . This is a measure of the posterior condence in the sign of the coecient, and it is calculated as the posterior probability that the coecient is on the same side of zero as its mean conditional on inclusion. We nd that the sign certainty statistic is very much in line with the posterior inclusion probability of the risk factors. When the posterior inclusion probability of a variable is high (such as for the market factor, the HML and the real estate factor), the sign certainty statistic is also high, meaning that we can be quite condent about the direction of the impact of a change in the risk factor on bank stock returns.
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Nevertheless, it has a posterior model probability of 'only' 23.83%. One other specication (which also includes the T-bill rate) is almost as likely and has a PMP of 23.5%. None of the other models has a posterior model probability exceeding 7.5%. Alternative models include other factors (2 of the top-10 models include the default spread or money market spread; the TED spread, the deposit spread, the eective exchange rate, and the VXO each appear once), but have much lower PMPs (7.3 percent for the 3rd most likely model to only 1.8 percent for the 10th most likely model). Fourth, while PIPs are in general much better in discriminating between good and bad models (see e.g. Ciccone and Jarocinski [13] ), it is still worth noting that the dierences in adjusted R 2 between a specication with just the market, HML, and real estate factor and more elaborate models is rather small, casting serious doubt on the usefulness of these additional factors in explaining bank stock returns.
BMA versus OLS
To what extent does BMA lead to dierent conclusions than plain OLS, i.e. To better understand the dierence between OLS and BMA, Panel B reports for each specic risk factor the proportion of signicant coecients (at the 10, 5, 1 percent level) obtained from OLS regressions of the banking sector returns on a constant, the market, and the specic risk factor on the one hand, and all other potential combinations of the remaining 10 risk factors on the other hand. This exercise conrms the relevance of the HML and real estate factor, as they are signicant at the 1 percent level irrespective of the (combination of ) other risk factors included. What is striking, however, is that a signicant relationship (at the 5% level) is found in 87.8% of model combinations for the 3-month Treasury bill rate, in 53.6% of cases for the SMB factor, 50.6% for the market sentiment indicator, and 21.9% for the money market spread. The low PIPs for these risk variables indicate, however, that the model combinations for which OLS nds signicance must have a very low posterior model probability. In other words, a researcher that imposes a particular model has a high probability of nding a signifcant slope estimate for these risk factors, but is unaware that the imposed model has a very low model probability within the (large) potential set of model specications.
Ignoring model uncertainty may not only lead to false conclusions about
what the relevant risk factors are, but may also have strong eects on the estimated magnitude of the economic relations. For instance, the OLS slope coecient for the three-month Treasury bill is more than three times as large as the one estimated using BMA (−2.37*** versus −0.69). We observe similar 3.1 Bayesian Model Averaging: Full Sample Results 16 dierences for many of the other risk factors. The magnitude of the BMA slope coecients is lower because the models with large estimated parameters (in absolute magnitude) happen to have a much lower model probability than those with small and insignicant estimates. In contrast, the low uncertainty about the inclusion of the market, HML, and real estate factor is reected in the small dierences between the OLS and BMA factor exposures.
To analyze whether BMA does also lead to better out-of-sample performance, we follow an 3-step procedure. First, we estimate the factor exposures using either OLS or BMA, over the last m quarters of weekly data. As before, we set m = 8, but test the robustness of our results to using 6 or 12 quarters instead.
Second, we calculate the explanatory power (Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD), Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), R 2 ) of our model over the next quarter (t + 1), using the exposures estimated using data until the current quarter t.
Third, we move the observed sample with one quarter, and repeat the analysis until the end of the sample has been reached. The rst 2columns of Table   6 compare the out-of-sample performance for specications, either estimated using BMA or OLS, that include all 12 risk factors. We nd that BMA leads to substantially lower MAD's and RMSE's, and higher R2's. Reducing the models only to factors that have either PIP's larger than 50% (BMA, column 3) or are signicant at the 5% level (OLS, column 4) does not lead to better performance. Increasing window length from 8 till 12 quarters or reducing it instead till 6 quarters has a negative eect on the out-of-sample performance statistics, indicating that our choice for 8 quarters implies an optimal tradeo between estimation noise and timeliness (shorter windows lead to higher estimation noise, but estimates reect more quickly new information). The last two columns compare out-of-sample performance between a model that only contains what we identied as the most important risk factors, namely the market, high-minus-low, and real estate factors, and one that contains all but the latter two. As expected, the performance statistics deteriorate substantially when the real estate and high-minus-low factor are excluded from the model.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity between the regressors could prevent us from nding the correct signicant relationships, as it tends to blow up standard errors. To test the robustness of our results to multicollinearity, we replace the TED, money market, and deposit spread all measures of some aspect of liquidity stress with their rst principal component. Additionally, we orthogonalize the VIX and the real estate indicator to innovations in the market and Fama-French portfolio returns. Our BMA results remain qualitatively the same. The change in posterior inclusion probability between the results in Table 5 and the results with this new set of regressors is 2% at most (for the three month Treasury Bill rate). Second, we test the robustness of our results with respect to a dierent model prior. One could argue that the uninformative model prior, giving equal prior probability to all models, puts too much weight on redundant models with correlated regressors, and too few weight on good but unique models. To address this critique, we use the collinearity adjusted dilution prior (George (2010)) to 3.2 Empirical evidence for dierent types of BHCs 17 downweight models with highly collinear regressors. Again, our conclusions remain unchanged. The highest dierence in posterior inclusion probability between the two dierent model priors is 3% (for the VIX). Results of these additional tests are available upon request.
Empirical evidence for dierent types of BHCs
The ndings discussed above for the portfolio of the 50 largest BHCs are largely replicated for the various BHC portfolios (Columns 2-7 of Table 8 ). The preferred models now also include the SMB Fama-French factor next to the market, HML, and real estate factor. Again, other factors have PIPs close to zero with very few exceptions. The volatility index VXO has PIPs of 85 and 90 percent for the portfolios of smallest 50 and retail BHCs, respectively, while the dierence between the Federal Funds Overnight Interest Rate and the 3month Treasury Bill rate seems signicantly related to the portfolio returns of the smallest 50 BHCs. Some interesting dierences in risk exposure can be found between the dierent types of BHCs. The exposure to market risk of the smallest 50 banks is smaller than the market risk exposure of the largest 15 banks, and the dierence is statistically signicant. The market risk exposure of distressed banks is statistically signicantly larger than the market risk exposure of sound banks. Similarly, the market risk exposure of tail risk-prone banks is larger than the upper bound of the condence band of the market risk exposure of retail banks. Regarding the SMB factor, it is not surprising that the exposure to the SMB factor of the smallest 50 banks is signicantly larger (and positive) than the SMB exposure of the largest 15 banks (negative). This holds also for the distressed versus sound banks. We conrm the importance of the default risk factor for distressed banks. The exposure to default risk of the distressed banks is signicantly dierent (and negative) from the exposure to default risk of the sound banks (which is estimated to be zero, and has a PIP of only 3%).
The importance of the MMS factor is dierent between the index constructed for the largest 15 and the 50 smallest banks. More specically, the PIP of the MMS is 17% for the largest banks, and only 3% for the smallest banks. This is in line with our intuition that it is usually the largest banks that can draw on funds from the money market. Moreover, we nd for the smallest banks that the exposure to the MMS factor is estimated to be zero, whereas it is negative for the largest banks. Regarding the exposure to real estate risk, we nd that the tail risk-prone banks are statistically signicantly more exposed to real estate risk than the retail banks. The PIP of real estate risk is 100% for tail risk-prone banks, whereas it is 67% for retail banks, and the magnitude of the exposure is also statistically signicantly larger (0.13 versus 0.03). 
Modelling Time Variation in Model Uncertainty
To show the importance of allowing for time variation, we proceed in two steps. In a rst step, we show in Table 9 the composition of the top-10 models before and after the start of the nancial crisis in 2007 for the portfolio of the largest 50 BHCs. That is, we now split the sample period in two: January 1986 -July 2007 and August 2007 -December 2010. We notice a number of interesting dierences between the full and subsample results. First, the optimal number of factors seems to be somewhat larger in the pre-2007 period, suggesting that the lack of accommodating for structural breaks may indeed be one of the reasons for the lack of signicant factor exposures. The VXO volatility index, the T-Bill rate as well as the dierence between the three month deposit rate and the three month Treasury Bill rate (DepS) are part of most, if not all, top-10 models pre-2007. Hence, in the pre-2007 period, banks were exposed to market sentiment (VXO) as well as interest rate risk, but not to credit risk. Either banks were able to properly hedge against defaults, or more likely, credit risk Relying on a single model during a crisis to assess and monitor bank risk is clearly insucient. Third, the adjusted R 2 of the top-10 models is much higher in the post-2007 period (83% versus 51%), which is consistent with the notion that common factors (and hence correlations between banks) become more important in times of high volatility. A nal piece of information regarding the time variation in factors, comes from a sample split analysis based on NBER recession dates. The full sample period is split according to an NBER recession indicator (equal to one on recession dates, and zero otherwise). From the 1247 datapoints, 142 have been recorded as in recession by the NBER. Table   7 shows the result of the BMA analysis on the split samples. Over the full sample period, the market index, the real estate factor, the HML Fama-French factor and the three-month Treasury bill rate (PIP of 50%) have been found to be the important variables. Splitting the sample between NBER recession and non-recession data shows us that two variables become important in addition to the previously listed ones: the default factor and the SMB Fama-French Uncertainty   19 factor. This is interesting, and in line with our hypothesis that both variables contain default related information. Furthermore, we notice some variation in other factors between recession and non-recession dates, but the dierence in importance is less clear. Interesting enough, the VIX implied volatility index is a more important driver of bank stock returns during non-recession dates. The importance of the TED spread (PIP of 12% over the full sample period) seems to be driven by its importance during periods of recession.
Modelling Time Variation in Model
In a second step, we investigate the time-varying factor inclusion and exposures in more detail. We estimate our BMA model over quarterly rolling windows of two years using weekly data 12 . Panel A of Table 10 shows for each 'bank type-risk factor' pair the percentage of observations with a PIP larger than 50 percent. Panel B of the same Table 10 shows for each 'bank type-risk factor' pair the corresponding marginal R 2 . The latter is calculated as the average (over time) dierence in R 2 between a model that does and a model that does not include a particular risk factor, conditional on that risk factor having at that point in time a PIP larger than 50 percent 13 In panel C, we report the average factor exposure for a given portfolio, conditional on that risk factor having at that point in time a PIP larger than 50 percent. Figure 1 On average across all portfolios, the market factor has in 92% of times a PIP larger than 50 percent, with an interquartile range (dierence between value of 75 th and 25 th percentile) of 14%. The smallest percentage is observed for the portfolio of 50 smallest BHCs (66%). Panel A of Figure 1 shows that small banks were mainly disconnected from the market over the 2000-2008 period, after which the connection was restored again. For large banks (both 50 or 15 largest BHCs), we nd, on the other hand, that the market factor loses signicance from the second half of 2009 onwards (which corresponds with an estimation window of 2007Q2-2009Q2). In the last six quarters of our sample period, the HML factor, which captures distress and credit risk, becomes more important than the market factor for the (larger and) largest BHCs. Table 10 conrms the result from the full-sample analysis that the Fama-French and real estate factors are the most important bank risk factors other than the market. The HML factor is on average 'on' in 58.3% of observations, with a tight interquartile range of 27%. The rolling-window estimates reveal that the SMB factor enters the optimal model in on average 53.5% of observations, though with a rather broad interquartile range (44%). Not including the HML and SMB factors in times their PIP is larger than 50 percent would lead to a substantial (absolute) loss in R 2 of 7.9% and 6.3%, respectively. De-The rst estimate is obtained for the last quarter of 1987. ! The marginal R 2 is calculated as follows: for each risk factor and in each estimation window, we take the dierence between the model weighted R 2 (where the weights are given by the posterior model probabilities), and the model weighted R 2 of all models, excluding the specic risk factor. In the latter case, the posterior model probabilities are rescaled to ensure that the posterior model probabilities sum up to one. 20 spite having a PIP of 100% in the full-sample analysis, our time-varying analysis reveals that the real estate factor has a PIP larger than 50% in on average 25% of observations, with an interquartile range of 19%. Wrongly excluding the real estate factor would lead to a moderate loss in R 2 of 2.2% on average. Figure 1 shows that nearly all cross-sectional BHC portfolios disconnect from the HML factor in the 2004-2007 period, to reconnect again during the global nancial crisis. The HML is 'on' most of the other times. The SMB risk factor seems to mainly aect the cross-sectional portfolios of BHC's. The largest BHCs are, however, most frequently exposed to real estate shocks. The marginal increase in R 2 from including the real estate factor is largest for the portfolio of 50 smallest BHCs (5%).
Panel A of
Modelling Time Variation in Model Uncertainty
The other factors exhibit a considerably smaller proportion of observations with a PIP larger than 50%. The implied volatility index (VXO) is 'on' in on average 13.8% of cases. The VXO seems most relevant during the LTCM-Russian crisis and to some lesser extent during the global nancial crisis. We observe the largest proportions for the distressed BHCs (18.7%) and 50 largest banks (17.6%). The marginal increase in R 2 is comparable to that of the real estate factor, about 2.2%, with a narrow interquartile range. The term spread factor is part of the preferred model in 11.9% of cases, and increases the R 2 with on average 3.1% (interquartile range of 1%). The largest 15 banks are more exposed to term spread shocks than the smallest 50 banks (12.1% versus 4.4%). Similarly, tail risk-prone have a more frequent exposure than retail banks (12.1% versus 4.4%).
To further investigate whether other factors than the market are signicantly related to bank stock returns, Figure 2 Figure 2 ), the marginal R 2 peaks to values close to 10% in the mid-nineties, directly after the Russian/LTCM crisis, and during the global nancial crisis. The increase in R 2 is not purely the result of increased explanatory power of existing factors, as the increase in R 2 seems also associated with an increase in the optimal number of factors. We obtain similar results for the cross-sectional portfolio analysis.
For the various portfolios of BHCs, we nd similar results with respect to the number of factors (with a maximum of seven relevant factors around the turn of the millennium for small BHCs, tail-risk prone BHCs and sound BHCs). The " Because we look at adjusted R 2 s, this dierence can indeed be negative. 21 gains in R-squared can be even more substantial, with maximal gains of 20% (for distressed BHCs) and 15% for the smallest BHCs and tail risk prone BHCs.
The main conclusion drawn from Figure 2 is that factors other than the market are important. Moreover, how many factors are important and their impact on explanatory power varies over time (especially in times of market stress) and across types of BHCs and FIs.
Implications for empirical bank research using stock returns
Models of bank stock returns are used as inputs in various types of empirical banking research, e.g., event studies, the decomposition of total bank risk in relevant components, proxies for bank opacity, and various related types of analysis. We document that the optimal combination of relevant risk factors may vary over time and may dier according to the type of bank holding company under investigation. This implies that due diligence is required in the specication of the bank factor model and that each empirical setup has to be tailored to the specic research question.
Many empirical banking studies examine the impact of an exogenous event on banks' valuation. These events could be bank-specic, such as mergers and acquisitions (Kane [41] and Hankir, Rauch, and Umber [32] ), or sector-wide; e.g. banking or nancial crises or regulatory changes (Johnson and Sarkar [40] and Mamun, Hassan, and Maroney [51] ). To conduct such an event study, it is crucial to obtain an accurate measure of the (cumulative) abnormal return in response to the announced event. Our study yields three suggestions for the computation of cumulative abnormal returns. First, it is important to control for other risk factors in addition to returns on a broad market portfolio. For example, for the set of the 50 largest banks, the optimal number of factors varies over time between one and six. The explained variation in bank stock return can be increased by as much as 10%. Not controlling for other factors may yield a misspecied factor model leading to incorrect abnormal returns. A simple exercise gives an indication of the potential magnitude. For the portfolio of 50 largest BHCs, we compute for each quarter (event window) the cumulative abnormal return, using the previous 8 quarters as the estimation window, based on our BMA approach as well as a single factor model. The average dierence over the 91 events (quarters) is small (−0.4%) 15 . However, the bias can be quite substantial during specic quarters and especially during NBER-dated recessions. In recessions, the average deviation in quarterly CARs is −4.9%.
Second, the BMA implied model specication varies over time. Hence, in an ideal setup, the specication of the factor model changes for events that take place at dierent points in time (for example, M&As). Third, imposing the same model for various types of BHCs in a given time period may yield biased (cumulative) abnormal returns, since dierent types of BHCs sometimes imply dierent models. For example, in 2000, a model with a single factor (the market) is sucient for retail BHCs, but would underestimate the R-squared of the richest model by almost 14% for tail risk-prone BHCs. Hence, abnormal returns (or other performance indicators such as alpha), based on a single factor model, could lead to an incorrect comparison between tail risk-prone banks and retail banks at the turn of the millennium. # This dierence in abnormal returns between our model and a single factor model is conceptually the same as the dierence in one-quarter ahead forecast errors between these two models. 23 The ip side of the above comment is that idiosyncratic volatility is overestimated whenever R-squared is underestimated. Using BMA, we document that this measurement is heterogeneous in two dimensions. Model uncertainty (both in terms of number of factors and the goodness of t) varies over time, but more importantly, also in the cross-section. Many studies try to explain the cross-section of banks' idiosyncratic volatility. For example, Stiroh [60] and Baele, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet [5] document that banks with more noninterest income have lower idiosyncratic risk up to a turning point (at which they become overexposed to non-traditional banking activities). In both studies, a similar return-generating model is used for the entire set of banks. However, we document that the model specications (and increased goodness of t) for retail and tail risk-prone BHCs can be substantially dierent from each other over certain episodes, which may aect the results of the aforementioned studies.
There is a large literature that studies the link between opacity and Rsquared (see e.g. Jin and Myers [39] and Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian [37] ).
Firms with more opaque nancial reports have stock returns that are more synchronous with market-wide factors and hence have a higher R-squared. In addition, there is theoretical and empirical evidence that opaque rms (with higher R-squared) are more prone to stock price crashes. Our results in Table   9 indicate that opacity is substantially larger in the post-2007 period compared with the pre-2007 period. When the R-squared is based on a single factor model, substantial mismeasurement can occur. For the portfolio of the 50 largest BHCs the underestimation of the R-squared ranges between 0% and 10%. More important, however, is that ignoring model heterogeneity for dierent banking types can lead to imprecise (but not necessarily incorrect) conclusions. For example, the dierence in R-squared between distressed and sound banks is underestimated (based on a single factor, market model) by 5 to 10 percent over the period 1999-2002. Based on an extended and more appropriate model, the dierence in opacity and crash risk between distressed and sound banks would be estimated more precisely.
Finally, omitting important risk factors may lead to biased estimates of market betas. Accurate estimation of the market beta is important for several reasons. First, the estimate of a bank's systematic risk directly aects the bank's cost of capital 16 . A second reason is that the estimate of systematic risk may aect the bank's (regulatory) provisions for market risk. Finally, systematic risk is used as a measure of risk in several studies (see e.g., Stiroh [59] and Saunders, Strock, and Travlos [55] ). In these papers, the estimate of market risk exposure (obtained in a rst step) is used in a second step as a dependent variable, and related to the riskiness of non-interest related sources of income, or the bank's $ This paper does not provide evidence on the pricing of the risk factors. To do so, one would need to set up cross sectional asset pricing tests such as in Fama and French [21] , or in Viale, Kolari, and Fraser [64] in the empirical banking literature. However, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 24 ownership structure. Hence, it is important that systematic risk is properly measured in the rst step. Figure 3 shows the divergence in market beta estimated in a benchmark onefactor model versus our posterior estimates of market risk exposure in the BMA analysis. During the period between 2000 and 2006, we nd a steady increase in the market beta from 0.5 to 0.9, a nding that has also been documented by Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam [6] , who report an increase in market beta from 0.4 in 2000 to 1 in 2006. During this period, both market beta estimates are very similar, suggesting a minor role for the other risk factors. However, during the most recent nancial crisis, we nd that the market beta obtained from a benchmark one-factor model increases, whereas the BMA market beta decreases; a clearly opposite pattern (see Figure 3 ). This suggests that the other risk factors gain in importance, as discussed in Section 3.3. In the recent crisis, the HML Fama-French factor, an indicator of distress, becomes more important.
A similar pattern emerges during the period of the millennium change, where the market beta estimated in a one-factor model is overestimated with respect to our BMA estimate, although to a lesser extent.
The gure shows that both measures are not always equal and that the largest dierences arise during periods of market stress, such as the period around the millennium change, and most strikingly during the recent nancial crisis. In a single factor model, the market beta "absorbs" information contained in the (missing) risk factors and tends to increase 17 . Yet, as is reected by the substantially higher R-squared of the multifactor model and the many signicant factor exposures, information is lost in this "absorption" process. We believe that studies trying to understand bank risk should not just relate bank-specic variables to the market beta, but to exposures of the full set of risk factors that are found to be relevant at a particular point in time.
Conclusion
Banks are exposed to various risks by the nature of their business. Through interconnectedness and contagion, individual bank defaults may aect nancial system stability and ultimately spill over to the real economy. Therefore, prudential regulation in the banking industry tries to limit banks' risk taking incentives. However, regulation did not prevent the 2007 − 9 crisis. Therefore, it remains important for supervisors to adequately track bank risk over time. The identication of relevant bank risks and their measurement remains an important challenge. This paper contributes to the literature that measures banking risk as the exposures of bank stock returns to a set of pre-dened risk factors. We start % To show this, we also run our time-varying BMA analysis on the twelve factors, in which each of the factors (except the market factor) is orthogonalized with respect to the market. Even in this setup, some of the other factors are signicant and the t of the regression is improved, indicating that these factors contain additional information. 25 by arguing that there is no consensus on what the correct set of risk factors is.
The 24 previous papers that we identify relate bank stock returns in various combinations to no less than 17 dierent risk factors. All models include a market and (combinations of dierent) interest rate factor(s). Other factors do not seem to be reliably related to bank stock returns. In a small simulation exercise, we show that when the econometrician ignores model uncertainty and impose a xed set of risk factors, she would frequently assume a risk factor to be statistically important. She would be unaware though that the models for which signicance is found have a very low posterior model probability relative to models that do either not include that risk factor, or where it is found not to be statistically signicant. The importance and positive and signicant sign of the HML factor exposure is consistent with the ndings of Liew and Vassalou [46] that the HML factor is positively (negatively) associated with news about the future state of the economy (distress risk) that is not captured by the market portfolio. Given that booming and subsequently rapidly decreasing housing prices were one of the key causes of the nancial crisis that started in 2007, our nding of a positive and signicant association of our real estate factor with bank stock returns is a relevant nding for bank supervisors. What is more surprising is that other factors, and in particular interest rate factors, do not seem to be reliably related to bank stock returns. This may suggest that changes in the risk factors were largely anticipated by market participants or that nancial institutions are expected to hedge their associated exposures.
Overall, we nd limited evidence that the relevant set of risk factors varies signicantly across dierent types of BHCs.
Our time-varying analysis shows that our failure to nd signicant exposures to risk factors other than the market, HML and real estate factor in the full sample is at least to some extent caused by structural instability in the estimated parameters. Other factors, such as the implied volatility, term spread, and SMB factor, which remained undetected in the full sample estimations, frequently switch between the`on' and`o ' state. The optimal number of factors varies between 1 (just the market) and 7, and tends to increase with market uncertainty. The increase in (adjusted) R-squared from including risk factors other than the market amounts at times to more than 20 percent. Hence, relevant bank risk exposures vary over time, which may have implications for bank management (e.g., the cost of capital), investors (e.g., expected returns from investing in bank stock) and supervisors (e.g., time-varying exposures of BHCs to unexpected economic or nancial market shocks).
A nal section explores the implications of our ndings for empirical banking research based on stock returns and for bank supervisors. Using a simple simulation exercise, we show that abnormal returns typically used in event studies are meaningfully aected by a (suboptimal) choice of risk factors, especially in bad times. Failing to include relevant risk factors also biases residual-based measures of uncertainty (idiosyncratic volatility), measures of opaqueness (Rsquared), and, as we show, also indicators of systematic risk (betas). Our most pragmatic advice for future research is to complement the market factor with at least a real estate and high-minus-low Fama-French factor. As a robustness check, one should examine the relevance of the small-minus-big Fama-French factor as well as the short-rate, default spread, and VIX factors. Table 1 : Independent variables used in factor models for bank stock returns: a summary of 24 studies This table presents an overview of the independent variables that have been included in models for bank stock returns. The independent variables are numbered from 1 to 17, indicating 1 (market risk), 2 (interest rate risk, short term), 3 (term spread risk), 4 (default risk), 5 (liquidity risk), 6 (market volatility), 7 (real estate risk), 8 (small-minus-big), 9 (high-minus-low), 10 (momentum), 11 (market dividend yield), 12 (ination risk), 13 (interest rate risk long term), 14 (deposit demand), 15 (exchange rate risk), 16 (bank portfolio return) and 17 (money supply). 1960-1979 X X X Tarhan [62] 1979-1982 X X X Kane and Unal [42] 1975-1985 X X Saunders, Strock, and Travlos [55] 1978-1985 X X X Choi, Elyasiani, and Kopecky [12] 1975-1987 X X X He, Myer, and Webb [33] 1986-1991 X X X Song [58] 1976-1987 X X Demsetz and Strahan [16] 1980-1993 X X X X Hess and Laisathit [34] 1981-1988 X X X X X X Chamberlain, Howe, and Popper [9] 1986-1993 X X X Hirtle [35] 1986-1994 X X Choi and Elyasiani [11] 1975-1992 X X X Flannery, Hameed, and Harjes [25] 1973-1990 X X Dewenter and Hess [17] 1984-1996 X X X X Elyasiani and Mansur [19] 1970-1992 X X Lajeri and Dermine [43] 1977-1991 X X X Chaudhry, Christie-David, Koch, and Reichert [10] 1989-1993 X X X X Stiroh [59] 1997-2004 X X X X Schuermann and Stiroh [56] 1997-2005 X X X X X X X X Viale, Kolari, and Fraser [64] 1986-2003 X X X X X X X X 33 The intersection of the 25% best capitalized and 25% most protable (ROA) BHCs in a given quarter
Distressed Banks
The intersection of the 25% worst capitalized and 25% least protable (ROA) BHCs in a given quarter
Retail Banks
We sort BHCs in quartiles according to ve characteristics: Size (=ln(Total Assets), Growth in Total Assets, the leverage ratio (Total Assets/Total Equity), wholesale funding share and the share of non-interest income in total income. We attach a score of 1, 2, 3 or 4 for each quartile sort. If the sum of the scores is at most 8, we classify a BHC as a retail BHC, which is a small, well-capitalized, slow-growing BHC, that is relying on core funding and interest generating activities
Tail Risk-prone Banks
We sort BHCs in quartiles according to ve characteristics: Size (=ln(Total Assets), Growth in Total Assets, the leverage ratio (Total Assets/Total Equity), wholesale funding share and the share of non-interest income in total income. We attach a score of 1, 2, 3 or 4 for each quartile sort. If the sum of the scores is at least 17, we classify a BHC as a diversifeid BHC, which is a large, highly leveraged and expanding BHC, that is relying on wholesale funding and diversied into non-interest generating activities Table 5 : BMA versus OLS This table summarizes estimation results for the static linear model estimated over the full sample (January 1986 to December 2010). Panel A reports results when using the portfolio of the 50 largest bank holding companies. Each column corresponds with a dierent risk factor. Panel A reports the OLS factor exposure and t-statisitc, the BMA factor exposure and corresponding t-statistic, as well as the risk factor's Posterior Inclusion Probability. Panel B reports for a specic risk factor the proportion of signicant coecients (at the 10, 5, 1 percent level) estimated for a model that includes apart from a constant, the market, and the specic risk factor all other potential combinations of risk factors. Panel C provides the specication of the top 10 models, ranked in terms of posterior model probability. The inclusion of a variable is indicated with a X. The table also contains the number of factors (all explanatory variables except the constant), the posterior model probability (PMP) and the adjusted R-squared. (January 1986 to December 2010). The columns correspond with the seven portfolios we use. These seven portfolios are the benchmark series (column 1), and six portfolios of various 'types' of bank holding companies (columns [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . For each risk factor-portfolio pair, we report 5 statistics, i.e. the OLS factor exposure and t-statisitc, the BMA factor exposure and corresponding t-statistic and the Posterior Inclusion Probability. This table summarizes estimation results for the time-varying BMA analysis over the period 1986-2010, using quarterly rolling windows of two years of weekly data. The table consists of three equally designed panels. The columns correspond with a risk factor, whereas the rows correspond with a bank type. Panel A (top panel) shows for each bank type-risk factor pair the percentage of observations with a PIP larger than 50 percent. In panel B, we report a marginal R-squared. The latter is calculated as the average (over time) dierence in (model weighted) R-squared between a model that does and one that does not include a particular risk factor, conditional on that risk factor having at that point in time a PIP larger than 50 percent. Finally, the lower panel C contains for each bank type-risk factor pair the average factor exposure, conditional on the pair having a PIP > 50 percent. In each panel, we also report for each risk factor the average and the interquartile range of the results for the eleven portfolios. 
